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We study the allocation of indivisible goods when monetary transfers are possible and
preferences are quasilinear. We show that the only allocation mechanism (upto Pareto-
indi⁄erence) that satis￿es the axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism is
the one that equalizes the welfares. We present alternative characterizations, and budget
properties of this mechanism and discuss how it would ensure fair compensation in govern-
ment requisitions and condemnations.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the moral and political philosophy, the central debate has been on the question of "Equality
of what?" (Sen, 1980). The two opposite approaches in this debate are resource/opportunity
egalitarianism and welfare/outcome egalitarianism. However, inspite of the seeming polarity
of these views on distributive justice, a surprising result has been obtained by Roemer (1986)
which establishes that these two opposing answers to the ￿equality of what￿lead to the same
allocation mechanism if one interprets resources in a broad sense such that they include the
internal attributes of people (such as talents, handicaps, and di⁄erences in preferences). Hence,
if the internal traits are part of the resources people consume, then there is no sustainable
distinction between equality of resources and equality of welfare.
Our main theorem complements Roemer￿ s result by showing the equivalence of re-
source/opportunity egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism.1 We do not need the assumption
that internal traits are part of resources. Instead, we argue that if one is resource or oppor-
tunity egalitarian, then the fairness axioms that should be imposed on an allocation rule are
￿An earlier version of this paper is circulated under the title "The Super-Fair Groves Mechanisms and Fair
Compensation in Government Requisitions and Eminent Domain Proceedings". The ￿rst draft of this paper was
written while I was a Ph.D. student at the University of Rochester. I am grateful to William Thomson for his
guidance and advice. I also thank Paulo Barelli and GÆbor VirÆg for their helpful comments and advice.
ySchool of Economics, The University of Adelaide, Napier Building, Room G 34, SA 5005, Australia; e-mail:
duygu.yengin@adelaide.edu.au.
1See Section 6 for a more detailed discussion of the di⁄erences between our model and Roemer (1986) model.
1egalitarian-equivalence (each agent should be indi⁄erent between her bundle and a common
￿ reference￿bundle) and no-envy (no agent prefers another agent￿ s bundle to her own), respec-
tively. We show that (under an e¢ ciency and non-manipulability requirement), there is only
one allocation mechanism satisfying these two axioms in our setting, and that mechanism is the
unique welfare-egalitarian mechanism. It is important to note that in several economic envi-
ronments (see Section 3 for speci￿c examples), no mechanism is both egalitarian-equivalent and
envy-free. Hence, the two axioms supporting resource and opportunity egalitarianism are not
always compatible. Note that when imposed separately, egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy does
not imply welfare-egalitarianism. We also show that, in our model, several other combinations
of the well-known normative and budget requirements of the fair allocation literature also imply
egalitarianism (see Section 6, Table 1).
We consider problems where a set of indivisible goods are to be allocated among a ￿nite
number of agents when money transfers are allowed and agents￿valuations of these objects
are their private information. We are interested in cases where fairness of the allocation is
important for the society. Fairness is especially important in two cases. First, when tasks are
imposed on agents (hence, agents do not have the option of refusing their task assignments)
such as in eminent domain proceedings and government requisitions (see Section 5 for a detailed
discussion of these cases). For instance, US military uses civilian aircraft for transportation, even
in times of peace (Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, 2004). Second, when agents have equal
rights over the allocated goods such as in the allocation of charitable goods among the needy,
auctions held to allocate water licences among the farmers, the allocation of social services in
a society (e.g. municipality child-care in Sweden), the allocation of pollution permits to the
￿rms, the allocation of farming resources in cooperative agricultures (planning in centralized
economies in general), the allocation of community housing, the allocation of inheritance among
heirs, and the allocation of landing rights to airlines.
Without loss of generality, we focus on cases where a ￿center￿ imposes a set of tasks on
agents based on their reported costs of performing the tasks. As also emphasized by Porter
et al., (2004), central allocation of tasks among multiple agents is a fundamental problem in
several ￿elds, including economics, computer science, and operations research. We consider the
case when agents have quasi-linear preferences over the sets of tasks and transfers.2 Although
obtaining results in a general domain of all preferences would be preferable, unfortunately,
when preferences are unrestricted, by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), there is no non-
dictatorial social choice function that is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies. The
assumption of quasi-linear preferences, which has been used in several studies (such as in Porter
et al, 2004) provides one of the few ways to circumvent this impossibility result.
We analyze a model where all tasks must be allocated, each task is assigned to only one
agent, and there is no restriction on the size of the total transfer3, the number of tasks or the
size of the transfer an agent can be assigned. A mechanism is a rule that allocates the tasks and
transfers among the agents. The following two properties are generally perceived as essential in a
￿ desirable￿mechanism: minimizing the total cost incurred by the agents (assignment-e¢ ciency)4
and ensuring that reporting the true preferences is a dominant strategy for all agents (strategy-
2The preferences are represented by utility functions that are linear in transfers: the utility of each agent
is equal to her transfer minus the cost she incurs in performing the tasks assigned to her. The assumption of
interpersonally comparable utility is sometimes criticized. See Roemer (1986) for a discussion of why use of utility
functions may be justi￿ed.
3One may require a mechanism to respect a certain upper bound on the total transfer. In Section 4.2, we
consider such a requirement as an axiom rather than incorporating it into the de￿nition of a mechanism or the
design of the model.
4In the case of allocating desirable objects, assignment-e¢ ciency requires that the total value enjoyed by all
the agents be maximized.
2proofness). Truthful reporting is essential to be able to determine an e¢ cient assignment and
an equitable compensation of agents. It is well-known that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
(simply referred to as the Groves mechanisms from now on) are the only mechanisms that satisfy
these two properties. The class of Groves mechanisms is rather large, and it is an important
quest to select the members of this class that respect various equity criteria. In the same setting
of ours, the analysis of the Groves mechanisms from the fairness perspective has been the object
of just a few recent studies (see Atlamaz and Yengin, 2008; PÆpai, 2003; Porter, et al, 2004; and
Yengin, 2008a,b). Our goal is to design fair Groves mechanisms.
Egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy are, arguably, the two central concepts proposed to
evaluate the fairness of an allocation in the axiomatic fair allocation literature (for an extensive
survey, see Thomson; 1998). These axioms have been studied in several economic models,
and are intuitively appealing on their own. Nevertheless, the appeal of these axioms increases
when philosophical theories of distributive justice provide foundations for these axioms which
we investigate below.
According to Roemer (1986), the di⁄erence between resource/opportunity egalitarians and
welfare egalitarians stems from whether one wishes to hold people responsible for their choices
or preferences after some ￿ starting-gate equality￿has been granted (this view is supported by
resource and opportunity egalitarians) or one holds people responsible for nothing but themselves
(this view is supported by welfare/outcome egalitarians and might be justi￿ed on the grounds
of moral arbitrariness of genetic endowments and environmental exposure). This issue has also
been extensively discussed in the liberal-egalitarian distributive theory of justice. According to
liberal-egalitarianism, fairness calls for eliminating welfare di⁄erentials that result from factors
for which agents are not held responsible and keeping the welfare di⁄erentials that are due to
the factors for which they are held responsible.5
In our model, the two reasons for the di⁄erences in the welfare levels of agents are resources
and preferences. Agents do not choose the set of tasks to be allocated. Hence, they should not
be held responsible for the heterogeneity of tasks. Let us investigate the two alternative views
on whether agents should be held responsible for their preferences.6 Note that since we work
with quasilinear preferences, the di⁄erences in preferences are due to the di⁄erences in the costs
agents incur to perform the tasks.
The ￿rst approach does not hold agents responsible for their preferences (cost functions).
One can argue that preferences are in￿ uenced by factors outside agents￿control such as social
conditioning or biological determination (Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1998). Thus, no agent should
be punished or rewarded for her preference (cost function). This view leads to the ideal of
equality of welfare (welfare-egalitarianism). We call a mechanism as egalitarian if all agents in
an economy experience the same welfare level regardless of their costs.
The second approach holds agents responsible for their preferences. For instance, Dworkin
(2000) argues that agents should be accountable if they develop expensive tastes. The two
moral ideals that hold people responsible for their preferences (cost functions) and not for the
conditions of the economy (heterogeneity of tasks) are equality of resources (Dworkin, 2000) and
equality of opportunities (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1995, 1996, 1998; and Kolm,
1996). Now, we will explain how these two ideals support, respectively, egalitarian-equivalence
and no-envy.
The utility di⁄erences among agents would be solely due to the di⁄erences in their preferences
(costs), and not the heterogeneity in resources, if resources were divided equally among the
agents, that is, every agent were assigned the same bundle. Since, in general, tasks are not
identical, an allocation composed of identical bundles may not exist. Still, we can choose an
5See Fleurbaey (1995) for an introduction to the literature on responsibility and compensation.
6See Matravers (2002) for a more detailed discussion
3allocation which is Pareto-indi⁄erent to an allocation composed of identical bundles (egalitarian-
equivalence).
Alternatively, pick an allocation and imagine that all agents are presented the same ￿op-
portunity set￿consisting of all the bundles comprising this allocation. Each agent chooses her
most preferred bundle from this set, hence her welfare only depends on her choice (i.e., she is
responsible for her own preference). If each agent chooses the bundle that is intended for her in
the allocation, then the allocation in question must be envy-free.
To sum up, the polar views on whether or not to hold people responsible for their preferences
are re￿ ected into the polarity between welfare egalitarianism versus resource and opportunity
egalitarianism, which is also re￿ ected to the polarity between the fairness axioms of egalitarian-
ism versus no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence, respectively.
We establish that, under assignment-e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, there is a unique
family of mechanisms, which we call the class of Super-fair mechanisms, that is egalitarian-
equivalent and envy-free 7, and the Super-fair mechanisms are the only ones that equalize the
welfares of the agents (Theorem 1). Hence, as in Roemer (1986), the more liberal position of
holding agents responsible for their preferences implies the more radical position of equalizing
welfare.
The Super-fair mechanisms have a relatively simple transfer structure: each agent pays the
aggregate cost incurred by the other agents at an e¢ cient assignment chosen by the mechanism
and pays or receives a sum of money that only depends on the population, and not on the cost
functions. Di⁄erent choices for this constant sum correspond to di⁄erent selections from the
class of Super-fair mechanisms: The independence of the constant sum from the cost parame-
ters allows the Super-fair mechanisms to satisfy several fairness notions at once (see Theorem
2). Also, we show that the center can impose an upper bound on de￿cit (or guarantee no de￿cit)
by choosing this constant sum in a particular way. Actually, under assignment-e¢ ciency and
strategy-proofness, several normative or budget requirements when imposed together, charac-
terize di⁄erent subclasses of the class of Super-fair mechanisms.
In Section 2, we present the model and de￿ne the Groves mechanisms. In Sections 3 and 4,
we present our characterizations. Section 5 discusses the application of our results to government
requisitions and eminent domain. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
A ￿nite set of indivisible tasks is to be allocated among a ￿nite set of agents by a ￿center￿ . All
tasks must be allocated. An agent can be assigned either no task, a single task, or more than
one task. Each task is assigned to only one agent. Let A be the ￿nite set of tasks, with jAj ￿ 1;
and ￿;￿ be typical elements of A:
There is an in￿nite set of ￿potential￿agents indexed by the positive natural numbers N ￿
f1;2;:::g. In any given problem, only a ￿nite number of them are present. Let N be the set of
subsets of potential agents with at least two agents. Let n ￿ 2 and N with jNj = n be a typical
element of N. The number of agents may be smaller than, equal to, or greater than the number
of tasks.
Let 2A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent i has a cost function ci : 2A ! R+ with
ci(;) = 0.8 We refer to such a cost function as unrestricted. Let Cun be the set of all such
7This result holds when there are at least three agents and costs are subadditive. For two-agents case, an
extension of Pivotal mechanisms are also egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free.
8As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
4functions. Our results can be easily adapted to a setting in which for each A 2 2A with A 6= ;,
ci(A) > 0:
If for each A 2 (2An;), ci(A) =
P
￿2A
ci(f￿g), then ci is additive. If for each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A
with A\A0 = ;, ci(A[A0) ￿ ci(A)+ci(A0), then ci is subadditive, and if for each fA;A0g ￿ 2A
with A \ A0 = ;, ci(A [ A0) ￿ ci(A) + ci(A0), then ci is superadditive. Let Cad;Csub; and Csup be
the classes of additive, subadditive, and superadditive cost functions, respectively. Let C be a
generic element of fCun;Cad;Csub;Csupg and CN be the n￿fold Cartesian product of C:
For each N 2 N, a cost pro￿le for N is a list c ￿ (c1;:::;cn): Let
S
N2N
CN be the domain of
cost pro￿les c where for each i; ci 2 C.
A cost pro￿le de￿nes an economy. Let c;c0;b c be typical economies with associated agent sets
N;N0; b N: For each N 2 N and each i 2 N; let c￿i be the cost pro￿le of the agents in Nnfig:
For each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N and each c 2 CN; let cN0 be the restriction of c
to N0 : cN0 ￿ (ci)i2N0:
There is a perfectly divisible good we call ￿money￿ . Let ti denote agent i0s consumption of
the good. We call ti agent i0s transfer: if ti > 0; it is a transfer from the center to i; if ti < 0;
jtij is a transfer from i to the center.
The center assigns the tasks and determines each agent￿ s transfer. Agent i￿ s utility when she
is assigned the set of tasks Ai 2 2A (note that Ai may be empty) and consumes ti 2 R is
u(Ai;ti;ci) = ￿ci(Ai) + ti:
An assignment for N is a list (Ai)i2N such that
S
i2N
Ai = A and for each pair fi;jg ￿ N;
Ai \ Aj = ;. For each N 2 N; let A(N) be the set of all possible assignments for N:
A transfer pro￿le for N is a list (ti)i2N 2 RN. An allocation for N is a list (Ai;ti)i2N where
(Ai)i2N is an assignment and (ti)i2N is a transfer pro￿le for N:
A mechanism is a function ’ ￿ (A;t) de￿ned over the union
S
N2N
CN that associates with each
economy an allocation: for each N 2 N; each c 2 CN; and each i 2 N, ’i(c) ￿ (Ai(c);ti(c)) 2
2A ￿ R:
For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let W(c;A) be the minimal total cost among all possible










2.1 The Groves Mechanisms
Since utilities are quasi-linear, given a cost pro￿le c; an allocation that minimizes the total cost
is Pareto-e¢ cient for c among all allocations with the same, or smaller, total transfer. Our ￿rst
axiom requires mechanisms to choose only such allocations.




For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let W(c;A) be the set of e¢ cient assignments for c:
Since costs are private information, an assignment-e¢ cient mechanism assigns the tasks so
that the actual total cost is minimal only if agents report their true costs. Then, a desirable
property for a mechanism is that no agent should ever bene￿t by misrepresenting her costs
(Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).




The so called Groves mechanisms were introduced by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and
Groves (1973). A Groves mechanism chooses, for each economy, an e¢ cient assignment of the
tasks. In the literature, Groves mechanisms are sometimes de￿ned as correspondences that select
all the e¢ cient assignments in an economy. We work with single-valued Groves mechanisms and
assume that each Groves mechanism is associated with a tie-breaking rule that determines which
of the e¢ cient assignments (if there are more than one) is chosen. Let T be the set of all possible
tie-breaking rules and ￿ be a typical element of this set.
The transfer of each agent determined by a Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each
agent pays the total cost incurred by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism.
Second, each agent receives a sum of money that does not depend on her own cost.
For each i 2 N; let hi be a real-valued function de￿ned over the union
S
N2N
CN such that for
each N 2 N with i 2 N and each c 2 CN; hi depends only on c￿i: Let h = (hi)i2N and H be
the set of all such h:
The Groves mechanism associated with h 2 H and ￿ 2 T , Gh;￿:










= ￿[W(c;A) ￿ ci(A￿
i (c)] + hi(c￿i): (1)
By (1), we have the following equation which will be of much use. For each N 2 N, each
i 2 N, and each c 2 CN;
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c;A) + hi(c￿i): (2)
By (2), for each h 2 H; the mechanisms in fGh;￿g￿2T are Pareto-indi⁄erent.10 That is, the
particular tie-breaking rule used is irrelevant in the determination of the utilities.
By Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), when all types of preferences are allowed
and there are at least three alternatives to choose from, there is no non-dictatorial, strategy-
proof social choice function. However, if we restrict our attention to the domain of quasi-linear
preferences, this impossibility result disappears as the following theorem indicates. This theorem
justi￿es our interest in the Groves mechanisms.
Theorem A A mechanism is assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof on
S
N2N
CN if and only if
it is a Groves mechanism.
Proof: Since for each N 2 N; CN is convex, the proof follows from Holmstr￿m (1979). 2
9See Thomson (2005) for an extensive survey on strategy-proofness.
10Let N 2 N and c 2 C




i)i2N are Pareto-indi⁄erent for c if and only if for




i;ci): The mechanisms ’ and ’
0 are Pareto-indi⁄erent if for each economy, they
choose Pareto-indi⁄erent allocations.
63 Characterizations of Egalitarian Mechanisms
3.1 Main Theorem: Equivalence between resource/opportunity egalitarian-
ism and welfare egalitarianism
Egalitarianism (in welfare) requires that in each economy, all agents should have the same
utility. This axiom is most appealing when agents are not held responsible for their preferences
(cost functions) or when the tasks are imposed on them and they are not morally responsible
for the completion of the tasks. In these cases, agents should not be treated di⁄erently due to
the di⁄erences in their cost functions.
Egalitarianism (Egal): For each N 2 N, each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) = u(’j(c);cj):
We introduce the following class of egalitarian Groves mechanisms. Let ￿ : N ! R be an
arbitrary function that associates each population with a real number.
The Super-fair mechanism associated with ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 T ; S￿;￿:
Let S￿;￿ ￿ (A￿;t￿;￿) be such that for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; (A￿
i (c))i2N is
an e¢ cient-assignment for c and
t
￿;￿





Note that S￿;￿ = Gh;￿; where for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) = ￿(N):
Let S￿ ￿ fS￿;￿j ￿ 2 T g: Let S ￿ fS￿j ￿ 2 ￿g be the class of the Super-fair mechanisms.
This class includes all Groves mechanisms that equalize welfares.
Proposition 1. A Groves mechanism is egalitarian if and only if it is Super-fair.
The transfers of a Super-fair Groves mechanism have a simple structure: each agent pays
the sum of the costs incurred by the other agents at the e¢ cient assignment chosen by the
mechanism and receives an amount of money determined by the function ￿: In all economies
with the same agent set N, the amount that agents receive is ￿(N); regardless of the cost pro￿le
in that economy. The fact that hi does not depend on the costs enables the compatibility of a
wide variety of fairness properties that is di¢ cult to achieve in other models (which is the reason
for the choice of name ￿Super-fair￿).
Next we present the two equity axioms central to the fairness theory.
If agents have equal rights over the resources, one may argue that fairness requires assigning
each agent the same bundle. However, such an allocation composed of identical bundles is not
feasible in all economies. Still, we can ￿nd a feasible allocation that is Pareto-indi⁄erent to
an identical-bundle allocation. Egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) requires
that only those allocations such that each agent is indi⁄erent between her assigned bundle and a
common reference bundle (consisting of a reference set of tasks and a reference transfer) should
be chosen (for examples of the use of this axiom in other models, see, Mas-Colell, 1980 and
Moulin, 1987).
Egalitarian-Equivalence (EE): For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; there are a reference
set of tasks (which may be empty) R(c) 2 2A and a reference transfer r(c) 2 R such that for
each i 2 N;
u(’i(c);ci) = u((R(c);r(c));ci);
= ￿ci(R(c)) + r(c)
7Another well-known fairness notion is no-envy (Foley, 1967), which requires that each agent
should ￿nd her bundle at least as desirable as any other agent￿ s bundle. Hence, given the
opportunity of choosing among all the bundles compromising an allocation, an agent should
choose her assigned bundle.
No-Envy (NE): For each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);ci):
Since egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy are motivated by di⁄erent ethical considerations, a
reconciliation would be desirable, and an allocation that satis￿es these two main fairness notions
can be claimed to be quite fair indeed. When costs are subadditive or additive, the Super-fair
mechanisms satisfy these two axioms; and if there are only two agents, the following Groves
mechanisms also do so.
The Extended-Pivotal Mechanism associated with ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 T ; E￿;￿:
Let E￿;￿ ￿ Gh;￿ be such that for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) =
W(c￿i;A) + ￿(N):
Note that on two-agent economies, the Extended-Pivotal mechanisms take the following form:
E￿;￿ ￿ Gh;￿ is such that for each N = fi;jg and each c 2 CN; t
￿;￿
i (c) = cj(A)￿cj(A￿
j(c))+￿(N):
Our main theorem indicates that on the subadditive domain, under assignment-e¢ ciency
and strategy-proofness, if one wishes to apply the two axioms that can be advocated if agents
are to be held responsible for their preferences/cost functions (namely, egalitarian-equivalence
and no-envy), then one obtains egalitarianism, which supports the view that agents should not
be held responsible for their cost functions.
Theorem 1. On the subadditive domain, a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent and
envy-free, if and only if
(a) on the class of two-agent economies, it is either an Extended-Pivotal mechanism or a
Super-fair mechanism, and
(b) on the class of economies with at least three-agents, it is a Super-fair mechanism.
For each ￿ 2 ￿; each ￿ 2 T ; each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let
D￿;￿(c) ￿
￿
E￿;￿(c) if jNj = 2; and
S￿;￿(c) if jNj > 2:
Let D be the class of such mechanisms. An alternative statement of Theorem 1 is as follows.
Remark 1. On the subadditive domain, a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent and envy-
free if and only if it belongs to either D or S:
Note that the mechanisms in D or S are egalitarian-equivalent on every domain. However,
the above result does not extend to the unrestricted domain, since PÆpai (2003) shows that on
the unrestricted domain, no Groves mechanism is envy-free. On the subadditive domain, she
characterizes the class of envy-free Groves mechanisms, and Yengin (2008a) characterizes the
class of egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms on any domain. By Theorem 1, while the joint
implication of egalitarian-equivalence and envy-freeness on Groves mechanisms is egalitarianism,
alone none of these two axioms lead to this implication.
Theorem 1 shows that for the Groves mechanisms, the two fairness axioms that would be
supported by the resource-egalitarian and opportunity-egalitarian theories of distributive justice,
8namely, egalitarian-equivalence and envy-freeness are compatible when costs are additive or
subadditive. This result is very fortunate since, in various economic contexts, the compatibility
of these two axioms is di¢ cult to achieve:
As showed by Postlewaite (quoted by Daniel, 1978) there are well-behaved exchange
economies where all egalitarian-equivalent and Pareto-e¢ cient allocations violate no-envy. In
time division problems (division of a one-dimensional, non-homogeneous, and atomless contin-
uum, when each agent is to receive an interval), no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism is envy-free
(Thomson, 1996). The same incompatibility also holds in the problem of allocating positions
in a queue when monetary transfers are possible (queueing problems). If we think of positions
as indivisible objects, this problem di⁄ers from ours in only three respects: each agent must be
assigned exactly one object, cost functions of agents are linear11, and there is a natural order
of the objects such that costs of objects are increasing with respect to this order12. In this
setting, if the number of agents is at least four and budget is balanced, then no mechanism
is egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free (Chun, 2006). A similar impossibility result also occurs
in a more general model of allocating indivisible goods and money where each agent can be
assigned at most one object (Thomson, 1990): if budget-balance is imposed, then no mechanism
is egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free.
A strengthening of egalitarian-equivalence is to require a particular set of tasks to be the
reference set for all economies. Let R 2 2A.
R￿Egalitarian-equivalence (R￿EE): For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN, there is r(c) 2 R
such that for each i 2 N; u(’i(c);ci) = u((R;r(c));ci) = ￿ci(R) + r(c):
Since utilities are quasilinear, ;￿egalitarian-equivalence and egalitarianism are essentially
the same requirements. Hence, a Groves mechanism is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent if and only if it
is Super-Fair. By Yengin (2008a), when there are two-agents, the Extended-Pivotal mechanisms
are the only A￿egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms. Hence, an implication of Theorem
1 is that for Groves mechanisms, egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy together imply that, for
each economy, the only admissible reference set of tasks is either the empty set or the whole set
of tasks.
Corollary 1. On the subadditive domain, a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent and
envy-free if and only if
(a) on the class of two-agent economies, it is either ;￿egalitarian-equivalent or A￿egalitarian-
equivalent,
(b) on the class of economies with at least three-agents, it is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent.
3.2 Alternative characterizations of egalitarianism
Welfare-egalitarian allocation rules have been characterized in several other models (Sprumont,
1996; Chen and Maskin, 1999; GinØs and Marhuenda, 2000; Maniquet and Sprumont, 2005;
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006, 2008). Moulin (1985) uses axioms of consistency, Pareto-
optimality, anonymity and two normalization conditions to characterize various subfamilies of
rules in egalitarian spirit (a particular solution characterized within this family is the Pivotal
rule13).
11Each agent incurs a waiting cost that is constant per unit of time.
12An earlier position in a queue is associated with a lower waiting cost.
13A Groves mechanism P
￿ is a Pivotal mechanism if P
￿ ￿ G
h;￿ where for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each
c 2 C
N; hi(c￿i) = W(c￿i;A): Pivotal mechanisms are also known as Vickrey mechanisms or second-price sealed
bid auctions.
9In Theorem 1, we characterized welfare-egalitarian Groves mechanisms by egalitarian-
equivalence and no-envy. This is only one of the many ways to characterize welfare-
egalitarianism in our setting. To state our next characterizations, let us present the following
axioms.
Our ￿rst axiom is a solidarity condition under changes in the total cost in an economy.
Suppose some of the agents experience a change (decrease or increase) in their costs such that
the total cost of an e¢ cient assignment increases. This is bad news for the society. Then, no
agent should be better o⁄ after this total cost increase.
Cost Monotonicity (CM): For each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN such
that W(c0;A) ￿ W(c;A);
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’i(c0);c0
i):
By (2) and cost monotonicity, for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN
such that W(c0;A) ￿ W(c;A); hi(c￿i) ￿ hi(c0
￿i) ￿ [W(c0;A) ￿ W(c;A)]: Actually, since hi
is independent of ci; a cost monotonic Groves mechanism satis￿es a stronger condition: if
the cost of an e¢ cient assignment increases in a society, then for any agent, the part of her
transfer that is independent of her costs weakly decreases (Proposition 2a). Note that we could
weaken cost monotonicity by requiring that whenever some agents experience an increase in
the cost of performing some tasks, then no agent be better o⁄. One may ￿nd this weak cost
monotonicity axiom more appealing than cost monotonicity. However, it turns out the class
of Groves mechanisms satisfying this weaker condition is actually the same as the class of cost
monotonic Groves mechanisms (see the proof for Proposition 2a).
Next, suppose that for each subset of tasks, agent i incurs a cost that is at least as high as
what agent j incurs. If j were assigned a lower utility than i, it would be as if j were penalized
for having lower costs. The following property14 is meant to prevent this situation.
For each A 2 2A; if ci(A) ￿ cj(A); we write ci ￿ cj:
Order Preservation (OP): For each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N, and each c 2 CN such that
ci ￿ cj;
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);cj):
Order preservation compares the utilities of two agents according to the costs they incur.
However, for Groves mechanisms, order preservation has further implications: if the costs of
some of the agents increase in an economy, then for any agent, the part of her transfer that is
independent of her costs also increases (see Proposition 2). Two facts play an important role
for this surprising result. First, for each agent i; the hi function is independent of her costs.
Second, order preserving Groves mechanisms are invariant with respect to the relabeling of the
agents within each population (anonymity).
Anonymity (An): For each N 2 N, each bijection ￿ : N ! N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN;
’i(c) = ’￿(i)((c￿(j))j2N):
Note that if a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is anonymous, then, given N 2 N; for each pair
fi;jg ￿ N; hi = hj:
For each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN, if for each i 2 N0;
c0
i ￿ ci; we write c0
N0 ￿ cN0:
The following Proposition describes the class of cost monotonic and order preserving Groves
mechanisms, respectively.
14The same axiom appears in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008). Also, a similar property appears in Porter, Shoham,
and Tennenholtz (2004) under the name of ￿no- competence penalty￿ .
10Proposition 2. a) A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is cost monotonic if and only if for each N 2 N;
each i 2 N; and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN such that W(c0;A) ￿ W(c;A);
hi(c￿i) ￿ hi(c0
￿i): (3)
b) A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ preserves order if and only if it is anonymous and for each pair
fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN such that c0
N0 ￿ cN0 and c0
NnN0 = cNnN0;
and each i 2 N;
hi(c0
￿i) ￿ hi(c￿i): (4)
It is easy to see that the Super-fair mechanisms are cost monotonic and order preserving.
Now, we present our second theorem which includes alternative characterizations of egalitarian
Groves mechanisms.
Theorem 2. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) A Groves mechanism is a Super-fair mechanism.
(ii) A Groves mechanism is order-preserving and cost monotonic.
(iii) A Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent and cost monotonic.
(iv) On the subadditive domain, a Groves mechanism is cost monotonic and envy-free.
This theorem implies compatibilities of several axioms as well. For instance, parts (i) and
(iv) indicate that no-envy and cost monotonicity are compatible for Groves mechanisms on
the subadditive domain. This compatibility is not guaranteed in all settings. For instance, in
queueing problems, no assignment-e¢ cient, budget-balanced, and envy-free mechanism is cost
monotonic (Chun, 2006). Compare this result to ours: the Super-fair Groves mechanisms are
the only assignment-e¢ cient, strategy-proof, envy-free, and cost monotonic mechanisms. (Recall
that we have to forgo budget-balance to ensure strategy-proofness.)
Solidarity axioms similar to cost monotonicity have been used in other models to characterize
allocation rules in egalitarian spirit. Gines and Marhuenda (2000) characterize egalitarian
allocation rules in a model where utilities are quasilinear, with the axioms of symmetry (if
everyone have same preferences, they should experience same utilities), solidarity (an axiom
corresponding to cost monotonicity in our setting), and Pareto-optimality. Moreno-Ternero and
Roemer (2006) characterize a family of rules that equalize an index of resources and outcome
levels by a solidarity axiom and an axiom that gives priority to less capable agents. See also,
Sprumont (1996).
4 Subclasses of the Class of Super-fair Mechanisms
We saw that the Super-fair mechanisms satisfy a large number of fairness properties including
anonymity, order preservation, egalitarianism, egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy (on the subad-
ditive domain), and cost monotonicity. The center can choose a particular function ￿ 2 ￿
depending on which additional properties it wishes the mechanisms in S￿ to satisfy. Di⁄erent
choices of function ￿ correspond to di⁄erent subclasses of the class of Super-fair mechanisms.
Next, we characterize some important subclasses.
4.1 Population Monotonic Super-fair Mechanisms
Suppose new agents join some initial population. The cost of an e¢ cient assignment in the larger
population is at most as large as the one in the smaller population. Hence, a population increase
is good news for the society. Since none of the agents in the initial population is responsible for
11the population increase, all of them should be at least as well o⁄ in the larger population as in
the smaller one (Thomson, 1983).
Population Monotonicity (PM): For each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0,
and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’i(cN0 );ci):
By (2), population monotonicity, and the fact that hi is independent of ci; for each pair
fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0, and each c 2 CN, hi(c￿i) ￿ hi(cN0 nfig) +
max
ci2C
[W(c;A) ￿ W(cN0 nfig;A)]: We can show that this inequality reduces to inequality (5).
Proposition 3. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is population monotonic if and only if for each pair
fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0, and each c 2 CN,
hi(c￿i) ￿ hi(cN0 nfig): (5)
Characterizations of welfare egalitarian rules using population monotonicity have been pro-
vided in several models. Chun (1986) considers quasi-linear social choice problems where the
society must choose among a ￿nite number of public decisions and monetary side payments
are possible. In this setting, he characterizes welfare egalitarian rules by Pareto-optimality,
anonymity, population monotonicity and two normalization conditions. In bargaining litera-
ture, Thomson (1983) characterizes the egalitarian solution by axioms of weak Pareto-optimality,
symmetry, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and population monotonicity.15
Our next result states that if we add population monotonicity in Theorem 1, then the
Extended-Pivotal mechanisms are ruled out and we are left with a subclass of the class of Super-
fair mechanisms. Hence, under assignment e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, (when costs are
additive or subadditive), egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy and population monotonicity together
imply egalitarianism in economies with any number of agents.
Theorem 3. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent and population monotonic on
every domain and envy-free on the subadditive domain if and only if it is a Super-fair mechanism
in S￿ where ￿ : N ! R is such that for each pair fN0;Ng ￿ N with N0 ￿ N;
￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0): (6)
Note that Theorem 3 shows the compatibility of no-envy and population monotonicity. How-
ever, in many models, these two axioms are incompatible. In particular, in exchange economies,
no Pareto-e¢ cient and population monotonic mechanism is envy-free (Kim, 2004). For the
problem of allocating an in￿nitely divisible good over which agents have single-peaked prefer-
ences, population monotonicity is incompatible with no-envy (Thomson, 1995b). Similarly, in
the problem of allocating indivisible goods and money where each agent can be assigned at most
one object and budget-balance is required, no mechanism is envy-free and population monotonic
(Alkan, 1994, Moulin, 1990, Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993).
15Although, in bargaining literature, many papers (e.g. Kalai, 1977; Myerson, 1977) characterize the egalitarian
solution using di⁄erent sets of axioms, Roemer (1986) argues that bargaining framework does not take into account
many of the information related to the speci￿c economic environment which is inherent in fairness literature (Foley,
1967; Varian, 1974; Thomson and Varian, 1985).
124.2 Super-fair Mechanisms with Bounded De￿cits
The Super-fair mechanisms ensure three of the desirable properties of a mechanism: e¢ ciency in
the assignment of the objects, immunity to manipulation by agents￿misrepresentation of their
preferences, and equity. However, another desirable property of a mechanism is limiting the
size of the budget de￿cit. By Green and La⁄ont (1977), no Groves mechanism balances the
budget16. A few di⁄erent approaches are designed to address this problem (see for instance,
Moulin, 2009). One approach is to design Groves mechanisms that respect an upper bound on
the de￿cit. We can also require that the mechanism never generates a de￿cit or always generate
a minimum level of surplus.
Suppose that for each population N 2 N; the center is willing to incur a de￿cit up to a
certain amount T(N). Let T : N ! R: The following axiom requires that for each N 2 N; the
de￿cit in any economy with population N, no matter what the costs of the agents in N; should
never exceed T(N):




Note that the revenue (budget surplus) of the center is equal to the negative of the total
transfer (budget de￿cit). Hence, if Gh;￿ satis￿es T￿bounded-de￿cit, then for each N 2 N and




i (c) ￿ ￿T(N): That is, the center is guaranteed to generate a revenue
at least as much as ￿T(N):
It is not always guaranteed that a Groves mechanism respects an upper bound on the de￿cit,
for instance, such a guarantee is absent when a Pivotal mechanism is used. Fortunately, there
are Super-fair mechanisms that provide such a guarantee: a Super-fair mechanism S￿ satis￿es





Actually, by Theorem 3 in Yengin (2008a), any egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism
that satis￿es T￿bounded-de￿cit must be a Super-fair mechanism satisfying (7). Also, among
all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms that satisfy T￿bounded-de￿cit, the ones for which
(7) holds as an equality Pareto-dominate the others. Let ST￿BD ￿ fS￿;￿j for each N 2 N;
￿(N) =
T(N)
jNj ; and ￿ 2 T g be the class of such mechanisms. Let SND ￿ fS￿;￿j for each N 2 N;




ti(c) ￿ 0: They also respect the following welfare lower bound:
It would be unfair if an agent were assigned all the tasks and still had to pay the center.
We require that the utility an agent would experience if she were assigned all of the tasks and
received no transfer should be a lower-bound on her welfare.
The Stand-Alone Lower-Bound (SALB): For each N 2 N, each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ ￿ci(A):
The following results are from Yengin (2008a).
Remark 2. (i) Let T : N ! R: A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ satis￿es egalitarian-equivalence and
T￿bounded-de￿cit if and only if it is a Super-fair mechanism satisfying (7).
16Budget is balanced if transfers add up to zero.
13(ii) Among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence and T￿bounded-de￿cit,
mechanisms in ST￿BD Pareto-dominate17 the others and they have the minimal surplus.
(iii) Among all Groves mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence and no-de￿cit, mecha-
nisms in SND Pareto-dominate the others and they have the minimal surplus.
(iv) A Groves mechanism satis￿es the stand-alone lower-bound and no-de￿cit if and only if it
belongs to SND:
4.3 Putting everything together
The greater the set of fairness axioms a Groves mechanism satis￿es, the more appealing this
mechanism would be since such a mechanism would reconcile the di⁄erent views on fairness
in the society. The next result characterizes a subclass of Super-fair mechanisms that indeed
satisfy all of the axioms introduced in this paper. These mechanisms also satisfy the following
stronger version of anonymity which requires that the names of the agents should not matter
even across di⁄erent populations.
Strong-Anonymity (St-An): For each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that jNj = jN0j; each bijection
￿ : N ! N0; each i 2 N; each c 2 CN; and each c0 2 CN0
such that for each i 2 N; ci = c0
￿(i); we
have ’i(c) = ’￿(i)((c0
￿(j))j2N):
Proposition 4. A Groves mechanism satis￿es strong anonymity, the stand-alone lower-bound,
population monotonicity, T￿bounded de￿cit, and one of the following:
(a) egalitarianism, or
(b) egalitarian-equivalence, or
(c) order-preservation and cost-monotonicity, or
(d) cost-monotonicity and no-envy on the subadditive domain,
if and only if it is a Super-fair mechanism in S￿ where ￿ 2 ￿ satis￿es the following conditions:,
(i) for each pair fN;N0g ￿ N, jNj ￿ jN0j if and only if ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0);
(ii) for each N 2 N with jNj = 2; ￿(N) ￿ 0; and
(iii) for each N 2 N; ￿(N) ￿
T(N)
jNj :
5 An Application of Our Results: Government Requisitions and
Eminent Domain
Government requisition is the government￿ s demand to use goods and services of the civilians
usually in times of national emergency such as natural disasters and wars. Governments generally
requisition land, property, food, medicine, vehicles, sea vessels, aircraft, and other equipment
and supplies, or technical-professional service from civilians. Condemnation18 is the act of
government seizing private property, without the owner￿ s consent, for public use, provided owners
receive just compensation. Eminent Domain is the legal term describing the government￿ s right
to condemn. In the United States, this right is granted, indirectly, by the Fifth Amendment to









with strict inequality for some i 2 N: The mechanism ’ Pareto-dominates ’
0 if for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and
each c 2 C
N, u(’(c);ci) ￿ u(’
0(c);ci) and there are N 2 N; c 2 C
N, and i 2 N such that u(’(c);ci) > u(’
0(c);ci):
18This term is used primarily in the United States. The same concept is known also as compulsory pur-
chase (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Ireland), resumption/compulsory acquisition (Australia) or expropriation
(Canada, South Africa).
14the Constitution, which states, in part, that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation". Beside real property, governments may also condemn personal
and intangible property such as a contract, a franchise, patents, trade secrets, and copyrights.
Both government requisitions and condemnations can be thought of as tasks imposed on
civilians. For the e¢ cient allocation of the tasks and just compensation of the civilians, it is
important to reveal the true costs that agents will incur. Since civilians have an incentive to
in￿ ate their reported costs to receive a higher compensation, a strategy-proof mechanism is
necessary. Hence, the Groves mechanisms may be the desirable mechanisms to use. We will
investigate whether Groves mechanisms can provide just compensations.
Government requisitions and eminent domain proceedings are controversial for several rea-
sons. First, they create a clash of liberty and property-rights of civilians with the sovereignty
of state. Also, it leads to the ￿sacri￿ce of the few for the bene￿t of many￿ . Here, not only
the sacri￿ce is involuntary but also it is di¢ cult to compare the costs incurred by the victims
of condemnation to the bene￿ts enjoyed by the public (see Norcross, 1997). Second, the use of
these powers must be justi￿ed by public use. In eminent domain proceedings, the most common
examples of public use are public utilities or railroads. However, for many years, courts have
read the public-use restraint broadly. For instance, an area can be certi￿ed as ￿blighted￿ in
order to expropriate real estates in that area and sell the land to private developers who will
build high-priced condos or shopping malls in the name of enhancing economic development, ur-
ban renewal, or job creation. Third, the determination of ￿fair compensation￿is problematic.19
Although, there￿ s been much debate about when the government can requisition or condemn a
property, far too little has been discussed about how to properly compensate the owners of the
property.
Since condemnations (or requisitions) do not take place by the voluntary participation of the
civilians, one may argue that civilians should be fully compensated for their losses. However,
the value that a condemnee attaches to her property, including sentimental or ￿idiosyncratic20￿
value is di¢ cult to quantify (see Kelly, 2006). Also, the condemnee has an incentive to overstate
the value to the government in order to receive a higher compensation. Hence, courts simply
ignore the condemnee￿ s valuation for her property21 and the condemnee is paid the current
￿market value￿of the good or the service taken by the government. This market value is not
determined in the market, it is not the price mutually agreed on by the government and the
condemnee. Instead, the market value that the court accepts as just compensation is the price
at which a similar property is traded in the market. This price generally undercompensates for
the condemnee￿ s full costs22, including the demoralization costs23. Let us question whether the
ongoing market price is a fair compensation.
Consider two people whose houses were condemned. The ￿rst condemnee recently moved
into her house where as the second one has been living there for many years, and wouldn￿ t want
to move to another place even if it was newer or more luxurious. The ￿rst condemnee would
19Vattel (1760), who is one of the ￿rst philosophers to discuss eminent domain, states the following: ￿Justice
requires that the community or the individual whose property was taken by the state be adequately compensated
for the loss, and if the state treasury were not able to bear the cost, all the citizens should contribute to the
payment.￿
20See Bell and Parchomovsky (2005) ￿Even where the object has close substitutes, the development of habit
and familiarity, or sentimental connection, may create rational idiosyncratic value.￿
21See Kelly (2006) ￿The United States Supreme Court has long-recognized that there is no practicable mecha-
nism for determining how much existing owners actually (i.e., subjectively) value their property.￿
22See Croson and Johnston (2000) ￿Courts typically do not even attempt to discern and compensate for sub-
jective losses above market values.￿
23See Fischel (2004) ￿Unlike impersonal forces such as markets and the weather, governmental actions that take
or devalue private property impose on owners and their sympathizers a special disutility, which Frank Michelman
(1967) identi￿ed as ￿ demoralization cost￿ .￿
15probably be content if she was paid the market value whereas the second one would need a higher
compensation to make her as well o⁄ as when she stayed in her old house, to which she has
emotional attachment. In cases like this, what is the fair price to measure the non-tangible value
of the property? As another example, suppose, in time of a national emergency, government
requisitions two technicians to perform the same type of task. The costs (￿nancial, time, or
psychological costs) these technicians incur to complete their tasks are not equal. Should they
be given the same compensation (so that resources are equalized) since they performed the
same task, or should the one who incurred higher costs receive higher compensation so that
their welfare levels are equalized?
To answer these questions, we need to decide whether or not agents should be held responsible
for their preferences (costs). Note that even if in general, agents were held responsible for their
preferences, they may not be so in government requisitions and condemnations, since agents
are imposed tasks involuntarily. This is more so if agents are not morally responsible for the
completion of tasks, in particular when the existence of public good is questionable.
Our results show that the Super-fair mechanisms ensure fair compensations regardless of
one￿ s view on how to assign responsibility. Hence, these mechanisms may provide a more equi-
table compensation method compared to the payment of the current market price of a property
similar to the condemnee￿ s property. The appeal of these mechanisms are also enhanced by the
fact that they assign tasks e¢ ciently, are immune to the overstatement of condemnees￿valuations
for their properties, and can be designed to limit the budget de￿cit.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our characterization of the Super-fair mechanisms builds a bridge between the di⁄ering views
on ￿equality of what￿ . In that sense, it complements the results in Roemer (1986) (see also
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer; 2008), However, our approach and model is di⁄erent. Roemer
analyzes a setting where divisible commodities are distributed among agents whose utilities can
be of any form whereas we restrict our attention to quasi-linear preferences over indivisible
goods and money. While Roemer assumes that the internal talents of agents are also non-
transferable commodities (resources) to be consumed, we have no such assumption. In our
setting, di⁄erences in internal traits are re￿ ected to the di⁄erences in the cost functions. Roemer
shows the equivalence between welfare-egalitarianism and resource-egalitarianism by designing
a mechanism that is the only one satisfying a set of normative and technical axioms24 that
support resource-egalitarianism, and he shows that this mechanism equalizes welfares. On the
other hand, we show that for the Groves mechanisms, welfare egalitarianism is equivalent to the
joint implication of resource and opportunity egalitarianism.
In this paper, we characterized several subclasses of the class of Groves mechanisms with
individual axioms such as order preservation, cost monotonicity, and population monotonic-
ity. When we looked into the e⁄ects of combinations of several axioms, we found that under
assignment-e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, several normative requirements when imposed to-
gether imply egalitarianism (see Table 1).
The following Table 2 summarizes the additional axioms that one may wish a Super-fair
mechanism S￿ to satisfy and the corresponding restrictions on ￿ 2 ￿.
The Super-fair mechanisms appear as appealing alternatives to the Pivotal mechanisms.
Although the Pivotal mechanisms have been the focus of most of the literature on the Groves
24Namely, unrestricted domain, weak Pareto-optimality, symmetry, resource monotonicity, cosistency of re-
source allocation across dimension, and continuity.
16On the subadditive domain:
1: If jNj ￿ 3, EE and NE , Egal (Theorem 1).
2: NE and CM , Egal (Theorem 2):
3: EE and NE and PM ) Egal (Theorem 3).
On any domain:
4: EE and CM , Egal (Theorem 2):
5: OP and CM , Egal (Theorem 2):
6: EE and T ￿ BD ) Egal (Remark 2).
7: EE and ND ) Egal (Remark 2).
8: SALB and ND ) Egal (Remark 2).
Table 1: Logical Relations Under Assignment-E¢ ciency and Strategy-Proofness.
St ￿ An for each pair fN;N0g with jNj = jN0j; ￿(N) = ￿(N0):
PM for each N0 ￿ N; ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0):
SALB ￿(N) ￿ 0:
ND ￿(N) ￿ 0:
T￿BD ￿(N) ￿ T(N)=jNj:
Table 2: Subclasses of the Class of Super-Fair Mechanisms.
mechanisms, whether they satisfy the axioms of the fair allocation literature has not been inves-
tigated completely. PÆpai (2003) showed that these mechanisms are envy-free. Unfortunately,
our results in this paper and Yengin (2008a) indicate that they violate other important fair-
ness axioms such as egalitarianism, egalitarian-equivalence, cost monotonicity, and population
monotonicity. On the other hand, there are Super-fair mechanisms satisfying these axioms.
Moreover, when a Pivotal mechanism is used, the center can not guarantee no-de￿cit and it
is not possible to impose an upper bound on this de￿cit.25 In the setting where objects are
valuable, e.g. the auction setting, the center always earns a positive revenue but this revenue is
not bounded from below (see Ausubel and Milgrom; 2006). On the other hand, we can design
Super-fair mechanisms that ensure that there is no de￿cit, the de￿cit never exceeds a certain
amount, or there is a guaranteed minimum revenue (see Subsection 4.2).
In imposition problems, agents do not have the option of refusing their task assignments.
Hence, even if they experience a negative utility, they have to perform the tasks assigned to
them. But in other problems where agents have the option of refusing their assignments, a
desirable property is that no agent should experience a negative utility level:
Individual Rationality: For each N 2 N, each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN, u(’i(c);ci) ￿ 0:
Proposition 3 in PÆpai (2003) characterizes the individually rational Groves mechanisms
on the unrestricted domain. Her result can be adopted to our model (the undesirable-objects
setting) as follows:
A Groves mechanism is individually rational if and only if for each N 2 N, each i 2 N,
and each c 2 CN;
hi(c￿i) ￿ W(c￿i;A):
It is easy to see that the Pivotal mechanisms are individually rational whereas the Super-fair
25For each N 2 N and each c 2 C








[W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A)] +W(c;A) ￿ W(c;A) ￿ 0:
17mechanisms are not. However, if there is an upper bound on the cost that any agent may incur,
then there are individually rational Super-fair mechanisms:
Suppose there exists K 2 R+ such that for each i 2 N and each A ￿ A, ci(A) ￿ K:
Then, on the domain of cost pro￿les comprised of such cost functions; a Super-fair mechanism
is individually rational if and only if it belongs to S￿ where ￿ : N ! R is such that for
each N 2 N; ￿(N) ￿ K: To see this, by (2) and individual rationality, for each N 2 N and
each c 2 CN; ￿(N) ￿ W(c;A): Since for each N 2 N; ￿(N) is independent of c; we have
￿(N) ￿ max
c2CNfW(c;A)g = K:
Also, in a setting where only desirable objects are allocated, then there are individually
rational Super-fair mechanisms. Let for each agent i; there is a valuation function vi ￿ ￿ci
and V be the set of all such functions: Let W(v;A) be the maximal total value among all
possible distributions of A to the agents in N (i.e., the value of an e¢ cient assignment). A
Super-fair mechanism is individually rational in the desirable objects setting, if and only if it
belongs to S￿ where ￿ : N ! R is such that for each N 2 N; ￿(N) ￿ 0: To see this, by (2),




In some of the following proofs, we use some of the results from
Yengin (2008a,b). The working paper versions of these papers can
be found at ￿http://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/duygu.yengin￿ and
￿https://economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/￿ .
Proof of Proposition 1: Let ￿ 2 T and S￿;￿ be a Super-fair mechanism. Then, by (2), for each
N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN; u(S
￿;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c;A)+￿(N) = u(S
￿;￿
j (c);cj):
Hence, S￿;￿ is egalitarian.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be an egalitarian Groves mechanism. Then, by (2), for each N 2 N; each
pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN,
hi(c￿i) = hj(c￿j): (8)
We will show that for each N 2 N, each i 2 N; and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN;
hi(c￿i) = hi(c0
￿i): (9)
Let N 2 N, i 2 N; and fc;c0g ￿ CN: Let ￿ : N ! f1;2;:::;ng: For each k 2 f0;1;::::;ng; let
ck 2 CN be such that for each i 2 N with ￿(i) ￿ k; ck
i = ci and for each i 2 N with ￿(i) > k;
ck
i = c0





￿i ): This equality and (8) together imply that for each k 2 f1;::::;ng and each
j 2 N; hj(ck
￿j) = hj(ck￿1
￿j ): This implies that for each j 2 N; hj(c0
￿j) = hj(c1
￿j) = ::: = hj(cn
￿j):
These equalities and the fact that cn = c and c0 = c0 together imply (9). Hence, there exists
￿ : N !R such that for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) = ￿(N): ￿
Proof of Theorem 1:
￿If￿Part: Let Gh;￿ be as in Theorem 1, that is Gh;￿ 2 (D [ S). Then, there is ￿ : N!R such
that for each N 2 N, each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; one of the following two cases holds:
Case I: jNj = 2 and hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) + cj(A) where j 2 Nnfig;
Case II: jNj ￿ 2 and hi(c￿i) = ￿(N):
18We will show that Gh;￿ is (a) envy-free on the subadditive domain, and (b) egalitarian-equivalent
on every domain.
(a) Assume, by contradiction, that Gh;￿ is not envy-free on the subadditive domain. Then, there
are N 2 N; c 2CN
sub; and fi;jg ￿ N such that u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) < u(G
h;￿
j (c);ci): This inequality
and equalities (1) and (2) together imply
￿W(c;A) + hi(c￿i) < ￿ci(A
h;￿





j (c)) ￿ W(c;A) + cj(A
h;￿
j (c)) + hj(c￿j): (10)
First, consider Case I. By (10),
cj(A) ￿ cj(A
h;￿
j (c)) < ci(A) ￿ ci(A
h;￿
j (c)): (11)
Since c is subadditive and A = A
h;￿
i (c) [ A
h;￿
j (c); then ci(A) ￿ ci(A
h;￿
i (c)) + ci(A
h;￿
j (c)): This
inequality and (11) together imply cj(A) < ci(A
h;￿
i (c)) + cj(A
h;￿
j (c)): Then, it would be less
costly than W(c;A) if j was assigned all the tasks; which contradicts that Ah;￿(c) is an e¢ cient
assignment.
Second, consider Case II. By (10), ci(A
h;￿
j (c)) < cj(A
h;￿
j (c)): This inequality and the fact that c
is subadditive together imply
ci(A
h;￿
i (c) [ A
h;￿
j (c)) ￿ ci(A
h;￿
i (c)) + ci(A
h;￿
j (c)) < ci(A
h;￿
i (c)) + cj(A
h;￿
j (c)):




j (c)) and j was assigned
no task; which contradicts that Ah;￿(c) is an e¢ cient assignment.
(b) Now, we show that Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent. By (2), a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is
egalitarian-equivalent if and only if for each N 2 N and each c 2CN; there exist a reference
transfer r(c) 2 R and a reference set of tasks R(c) 2 2A such that for each i 2 N;
hi(c￿i) = W(c;A) + r(c) ￿ ci(R(c)): (12)
First, consider Case I. For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let R(c) = A and r(c) = ￿W(c;A) + P
i2N
ci(A) + ￿(N): Then, by (12), Gh;￿ is A￿egalitarian-equivalent.
Second, consider Case II. For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let R(c) = ; and r(c) = ￿W(c;A)+
￿(N): Then, by (12), Gh;￿ is is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent.
￿Only If￿Part: Let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that is egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free
on the subadditive domain. We will show that Gh;￿ 2 (D [ S):
The following result is from PÆpai (2003), Theorem 1 adapted to our variable-population and
undesirable-objects setting:
On the subadditive domain, a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is envy-free if and only if there exists
a list of functions indexed by populations, f￿NgN2N with ￿N : R+ ! R such that
(i) for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN
sub;
hi(c￿i) = ￿N(W(c￿i;A)); (13)
(ii) for each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN





19By (12) and (13), for each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2CN
sub;
￿N(W(c￿i;A)) ￿ ￿N(W(c￿j;A)) = cj(R(c)) ￿ ci(R(c)): (15)
Note that following Yengin (2008a), Gh;￿ belongs to D [ S if and only if for economies with
more than two agents, it is ;￿egalitarian-equivalent and, on the class of two-agent economies,
it is either ;￿egalitarian-equivalent or A￿egalitarian-equivalent. Hence, we need to prove that
the following two cases hold:
Case 1: For each N 2 N with jNj = 2 and each c 2CN
sub; there is r(c) 2 R such that (12) holds
for either R(c) = ; or R(c) = A:
Proof of Case 1:
Let N 2 N with jNj = 2 and c 2CN
sub: Let r(c) 2 R and R(c) 2 2A together satisfy (12).
Without loss of generality, let N = fi;jg:
First, assume that ci(R(c)) = cj(R(c)): Then, R0(c) = ; and r0(c) = r(c) ￿ ci(R(c)) together
satisfy (12) which would prove Cases 1:
Next, assume that
ci(R(c)) 6= cj(R(c)): (16)
Let ￿ ￿ cj(R(c)) ￿ ci(R(c)): Without loss of generality, let ci(A) ￿ cj(A): Let b c 2CN
sub be as
follows:
(i) for each A ￿ A; b ci(A) =
jAj ci(A)
jAj ;
(ii) there is " > 0 such that for each A   A; b cj(A) = jAj
￿
cj(A)
jAj + ￿ + "
￿
;
(iii) b cj(A) = cj(A):
By (i) and (ii), for each A 2 (2Anf;;Ag);








Note that W(b c￿i;A) = W(c￿i;A) = cj(A): Also, W(b c￿j;A) = W(c￿j;A) = ci(A): These
equalities and (15) together imply
cj(R(c)) ￿ ci(R(c)) = b cj(R(b c)) ￿ b ci(R(b c)) = ￿: (18)
This equality and (17) together imply R(b c) 2 f;;Ag: If R(b c) = ;; then cj(R(c)) = ci(R(c)); which
contradicts (16). If R(b c) = A; then by (18), (i) and (iii), ci(A) ￿ ci(R(c)) = cj(A) ￿ cj(R(c)):
Then, R00(c) = A and r00(c) = r(c) + ci(A) ￿ ci(R(c)) together satisfy (12) which proves Case 1.
Case 2: For each N 2 N with jNj ￿ 3 and each c 2CN
sub; there is r(c) 2 R such that (12) holds
for R(c) = ;:
Proof of Case 2:
Let N 2 N with jNj ￿ 3 and c 2CN
sub: Let r(c) 2 R and R(c) 2 2A together satisfy (12).
First, assume that for each pair fi;jg ￿ N, ci(R(c)) = cj(R(c)): Then, R0(c) = ; and r0(c) =
r(c) ￿ ci(R(c)) for some i 2 N; together satisfy (12) which proves Case 2:
Next, assume that for some pair fi;jg ￿ N,
ci(R(c)) 6= cj(R(c)): (19)
20Let ￿ ￿ cj(R(c))￿ci(R(c)): Without loss of generality, let W(c￿j;A) ￿ W(c￿i;A): Let b c 2CN
sub
be as follows:
(i) for each A 2 2A; b ci(A) =
jAj W(c￿j;A)
jAj ;
(ii) there is " > maxf￿￿;0g such that for each A 2 2A; b cj(A) = jAj
￿
W(c￿i;A)
jAj + ￿ + "
￿
;
(iii) for each k 2 Nnfi;jg and each A 2 2A; b ck(A) =
jAj W(c￿i;A)
jAj :
By (i) and (ii), for each A 2 (2An;);








Note that W(b c￿i;A) = W(c￿i;A) which is obtained by assigning A to some k 2 Nnfi;jg: Also,
W(b c￿j;A) = W(c￿j;A) which is obtained by assigning A to agent i: These equalities and (15)
together imply cj(R(c)) ￿ ci(R(c)) = b cj(R(b c)) ￿ b ci(R(b c)) = ￿: This equality and (20) together
imply R(b c) = ; and cj(R(c)) = ci(R(c)): This equality contradicts (19). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
a) Let h 2 H be as in equation (3). Then, by (2), Gh;￿ is cost monotonic.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a cost monotonic Groves mechanism. Assume, by contradiction, that
there are N 2 N; fc;c0g ￿ CN such that W(c 0;A) ￿ W(c;A); and i 2 N for which
hi(c￿i) < hi(c0
￿i): (21)
For each A 2 (2An;); let P(A) = fA1;A2;:::;Akg be a partition of A into k ￿ jAj non-empty
subsets. That is, for each pair fA0;A00g ￿ P(A); A0 \ A00 = ; and [
A02P(A)
A0 = A. Let P(A) ￿
fP(A) : P(A) 6= fAgg be the set of all partitions of A except for the partition fAg:
Let b ci be such that for each A 2 2A;



















As an illustration, suppose A = f￿;￿;￿g, N = fi;jg; and fc;c0g ￿ CN: The following table
presents c;c0 and the corresponding b ci:
f￿g f￿g f￿g f￿;￿g f￿;￿g f￿;￿g A
ci 10 5 9 7 18 13 21
cj 7 6 8 13 14 16 30
c0
i 3 6 11 9 18 18 21
c0
j 9 7 10 15 17 12 33
b ci 3 5 8 7 11 12 15
To see how b ci is calculated, consider A = fa;￿g: There are two ways to partition A : P(A) =
ffag;f￿gg and P0(A) = fAg: Here, P(A) = fP(A)g and
P
A02P(A)










= 7 < 8; by (22); b ci(A) = 7: ￿
Let b c = (b ci;c￿i) and b c 0 = (b ci;c0
￿i): First, we show that b ci 2 C and hence, fb c;b c 0g ￿ CN:
21Lemma 1. a: If C 2 fCad;Csupg; then b ci is additive. (i.e., b ci 2 Cad and b ci 2 Csup).
b: If C 2 fCsub,Cung; then b ci is subadditive (i.e., b ci 2 Csub and b ci 2 Cun).
Proof of Lemma 1:


















b ci(f￿g): This fact









Hence, b ci is additive:
(b) Suppose C 2 fCsub,Cung: By (22); for each A 2 2A;






Hence, b ci is subadditive: ￿
Note that b c￿i = c￿i and b c 0
￿i = c0
￿i. These equalities and (21) together imply
hi(b c￿i) < hi(b c 0
￿i): (23)
By (22), for each j 2 N and each A 2 2A; b ci(A) ￿ minfcj(A);c0
j(A)g: This inequality and the fact
that b ci is additive or subadditive (by Lemma 1) together imply W(b c;A) = W(b c 0;A) = b ci(A):
These equalities, cost monotonicity, and equation (2) together imply hi(b c￿i) = hi(b c 0
￿i); which
contradicts (23):
Remark 3. In the proof of the Proposition 2a, we can require fc;c0g ￿ CN to be as follows:
there is N0 ￿ N such that c0
N0 ￿ cN0 and c0
NnN0 = cNnN0: This requirement would not e⁄ect the
rest of the proof. Hence, if we impose weak cost monotonicity instead of cost monotonicity, we
still characterize the same class.
b) Let Gh;￿ be anonymous and h 2 H be as in equation (4). By anonymity, for each N 2 N,
there is hN : CN ! R such that for each i 2 N; hi = hN: Assume, by contradiction, that Gh;￿
does not preserve order. Then, there are N 2 N; fi;jg ￿ N; and c 2 CN such that ci ￿ cj and
u(’i(c);ci) > u(’j(c);cj): This inequality, anonymity, and equation (2) together imply
hN(c￿i) > hN(c￿j): (24)
Let c0 2 CN be such that c0
j = ci and c0
￿j = c￿j : Since c0
j ￿ cj and c0
Nnfjg = cNnfjg; by (4),
hN(c0
￿i) ￿ hN(c￿i): This inequality and the fact that c0
￿i = c￿j together imply hN(c￿j) ￿
hN(c￿i), which contradicts (24).
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be an order preserving Groves mechanism. By Proposition 1 in Yengin
(2008a), Gh;￿ is anonymous. Hence, for each N 2 N, there is hN : CN ! R such that for each
i 2 N; hi = hN: Assume, by contradiction, that there are fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N;
fc;c0g ￿ CN such that c0
N0 ￿ cN0 and c0
NnN0 = cNnN0; and i 2 N such that
hN(c￿i) > hN(c0
￿i): (25)
22Without loss of generality, let N = f1;2;:::;ng: By anonymity, we can assume that N is as
follows: i = n; and if n = 2 N0; then for each 1 ￿ j ￿ n0; j 2 N0; and if n 2 N0; then for each
1 ￿ j ￿ n0 ￿ 1; j 2 N0:






For each r 2 N0nfng; let c(r) 2 CN be such that c
(r)

































For each r 2 N0nfng; since c0


















￿n ): Since this
inequality is true for each r 2 N0nfng; by the transitivity of ￿;
hN(c
(n0)
￿n ) ￿ hN(c
(0)
￿n) if n = 2 N0; and hN(c
(n0￿1)
￿n ) ￿ hN(c
(0)
￿n) if n 2 N0: (26)
Note that c
(0)
￿n = c￿n; and if n = 2 N0; then c
(n0)
￿n = c0




equalities and (26) together imply hN(c0
￿n) ￿ hN(c￿n):Since i = n; this inequality contradicts
(25). ￿
Proof of Theorem 2:
(i) Let Gh;￿ be a Super-fair mechanism. Then, there is ￿ : N ! R such that for each N 2 N;
each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) = ￿(N):
(ii) Let Gh;￿ be an order preserving and cost monotonic Groves mechanism. Let N 2 N and
fc;c0g ￿ CN: For each i 2 N; let b ci be as in (22): By Lemma 1, if C 2 fCsub;Cung, then b ci is
subadditive: Otherwise, b ci is additive. Let b c = (b ci)i2N 2 CN: Note that b c ￿ c and b c ￿ c0:
By (4), there is hN : CN ! R such that for each i 2 N; hi = hN and hN(b c￿i) ￿ hN(c￿i) and
hN(b c￿i) ￿ hN(c0
￿i):
Note that W(b c;A) ￿ W(c;A) and W(b c;A) ￿ W(c0;A): By (3), for each i 2 N; hN(b c￿i) ￿
hN(c￿i) and hN(b c￿i) ￿ hN(c0
￿i): Altogether, for each i 2 N; hN(b c￿i) = hN(c￿i) = hN(c0
￿i):
That is, for each N 2 N and each pair fc;c0g ￿ CN; there is ￿(N) 2 R such that for each i 2 N;
hN(c￿i) = hN(c0
￿i) = ￿(N). In other words, there is ￿ : N ! R such that for each N 2 N; each
i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) = ￿(N):
(iii) Follows from (ii) and the fact that every egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism preserves
order. To see the later part, let Gh;￿ be an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism. Let N 2 N;
fi;jg ￿ N, and c 2 CN be such that cj ￿ ci: Then, by (12); hi(c￿i) ￿ hj(c￿j): By (2), Gh;￿
preserves order.
(iv) Follows from (ii) and the fact that on the subadditive domain, every envy-free Groves
mechanism preserves order. To see the later part, let Gh;￿ be an envy-free Groves mechanism.
Let N 2 N; fi;jg ￿ N, and c 2 CN
sub be such that cj ￿ ci: Note that W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c￿j;A):
By (14), hi(c￿i) ￿ hj(c￿j): By (2), Gh;￿ preserves order. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: Let h 2 H be as in equation (5). Let fN;N0g ￿ N be such that





i (cN0);ci): Hence, Gh;￿ is population monotonic.
23Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a population monotonic Groves mechanism. Assume, by contradiction,
that there are fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N, i 2 N0; and c 2 CN for which
hi(c￿i) < hi(cN0 nfig): (27)
Let b ci be such that for each A 2 2A;
















By a similar argument to that in Lemma 1, b ci 2 C: Let b c = (b ci;c￿i) 2 CN: Since b c￿i = c￿i and
b cN0 nfig = cN0 nfig; by (27)
hi(b c￿i) < hi(b cN0 nfig): (29)
By (28), for each j 2 Nnfig and each A 2 2A; b ci(A) ￿ cj(A): This inequality and and the fact
that b ci is additive or subadditive together imply W(b c;A) = W(b cN0;A) = b ci(A): These equalities,
population monotonicity, and (2) together imply hi(b c￿i) ￿ hi(b cN0 nfig); which contradicts (29): ￿
Proof of Theorem 3: Let S￿;￿ be a Super-fair mechanism such that ￿ is as in Theorem 3.
By Theorem 1, S￿;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent and on the subadditive domain, it is envy-free. By
Proposition 3, S￿;￿ is population monotonic.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that is egalitarian-equivalent, population monotonic,
and envy-free on the subadditive domain. By Theorem 1, Gh;￿ belongs to either D or to S.
Suppose that Gh;￿ 2 D. Then, there is ￿ : N!R such that Gh;￿ = D￿;￿:
Let N = fi;j;kg 2 N and c 2 CN
sub: Then, hi(cj;ck) = ￿(N) and hi(cj) = cj(A) + ￿(fi;jg):
Let " > maxf0;￿(fi;jg) ￿ ￿(N)g and b cj 2 Cad be such that for each A 2 2A; b cj(A) =
jAj
jAj (￿(N) ￿ ￿(fi;jg) + "):
Then, hi(b cj;ck) = ￿(N) and hi(b cj) = b cj(A) + ￿(fi;jg): Since b cj(A) = ￿(N) ￿ ￿(fi;jg) + "; we
have hi(b cj) = ￿(N) + " > hi(b cj;ck): This inequality contradicts (5). Hence, Gh;￿ can not be in
D.
Next, let Gh;￿ 2 S. Then, there is ￿ : N!R such that Gh;￿ = S￿;￿: Let fN0;Ng ￿ N be such
that N0 ￿ N and c 2 CN: Then, hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) and hi(cN0nfig) = ￿(N0): By (5), ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0):
Hence, we obtain equation (6) in Theorem 3. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Let S￿;￿ 2 S￿ satisfy the conditions (i), (ii), and (iii). It is easy
to see that S￿;￿ satis￿es all the axioms stated in Proposition 4. Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a
Groves mechanism that satis￿es strong anonymity, the stand-alone lower-bound, population
monotonicity, and T￿bounded de￿cit. Let Gh;￿ satisfy the axioms either in (a), (b), (c), or (d)
in Proposition 4. Then, by either Proposition 1, Remark 2i, or Theorem 2, Gh;￿ is Super-fair.
Hence, there is ￿ : N ! R such that Gh;￿ = S￿;￿:
By strong anonymity, for each pair fN;N0g ￿ N with jNj = jN0j; ￿(N) = ￿(N0).
By the stand-alone lower-bound and Theorem 2 in Yengin (2008b), for each N 2 N with jNj ￿ 2;
￿(N) ￿ 0:
By population monotonicity, strong anonymity, and (6), for each pair fN;N0g ￿ N with jNj >
jN0j; ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0):
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